{"id":1492981,"date":"2024-09-30T06:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-09-30T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/?p=1492981"},"modified":"2024-09-30T06:00:00","modified_gmt":"2024-09-30T10:00:00","slug":"five-lessons-that-russia-can-learn-from-the-latest-israeli-lebanese-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/five-lessons-that-russia-can-learn-from-the-latest-israeli-lebanese-war\/1492981\/","title":{"rendered":"Five Lessons That Russia Can Learn From The Latest Israeli-Lebanese War"},"content":{"rendered":"

Five Lessons That Russia Can Learn From The Latest Israeli-Lebanese War<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack.com,<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

The\u00a0latest Israeli-Lebanese War<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0Ukrainian<\/a>\u00a0Conflict<\/a>\u00a0are so different from one another as to be practically incomparable, but Russia can still learn some general lessons from Israel if it has the will.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The first is that prioritizing military goals increases the chances of achieving political ones. <\/strong>Russia\u2019s special operation continues to be characterized by self-restraint, which is influenced by Putin\u2019s magnum opus \u201cOn the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians<\/a>\u201d, unlike Israel\u2019s conduct in its war with Lebanon.<\/p>\n

The expectation was that the lightning-fast on-the-ground advances during the opening stage of the conflict would coerce Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands that were made of him. The only miniscule collateral damage that would have occurred could have then facilitated the process of Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation. This plan was predicated on Zelensky\u2019s capitulation, which didn\u2019t happen. Instead, he was\u00a0convinced<\/a>\u00a0by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to keep fighting.<\/p>\n

Israel never thought that a lasting deal is possible with Hezbollah, unlike what Russia thought and arguably still thinks is possible with Ukraine\u2019s post-\u201cMaidan\u201d authorities, which is why Tel Aviv would never take a page from Moscow\u2019s playbook by carrying out \u201cgoodwill gestures\u201d in pursuit of that. From Israel\u2019s perspective, political goals can only be achieved after a military victory, not the inverse like Russia believes with regard to the notion that a political victory can lead to the attainment of military goals.<\/p>\n

The second lesson is the importance of superior intelligence. <\/strong>Russia was reportedly under the impression cultivated by its Ukrainian assets in the run-up to the special operation that the locals would greet its troops with flowers and then Zelensky\u2019s government would collapse. Intelligence collection focused mostly on the socio-political situation in Ukraine, which turned out to be incredibly inaccurate, and not on military details. That\u2019s why Russian troops were surprised by Ukraine\u2019s Javelin and Stinger arsenals.<\/p>\n

It also seems to be the case in retrospect that Russia\u2019s Ukrainian assets told their handlers what they thought they wanted to hear, whether to deceive them or because they thought that telling tough truths could risk them being taken off the payroll. Russia either didn\u2019t verify the socio-political intelligence that it received or the other sources that it relied on were driven by the same motives. In any case, an alternative reality was created, which reinforced the prioritization of political goals over military ones.<\/p>\n

Israel is no doubt interested in Lebanon\u2019s socio-political situation, but it cares much more about tangible military intelligence that can be verified with images than intangible impressions of public opinion that could be shaded by their source\u2019s biases and aren\u2019t as easy to verify. These different intelligence collection priorities are the natural result of the different conflicts that they planned to wage as explained in the preceding lesson that Russia can learn from Israel. \u00a0<\/p>\n

The third is that Russia remains sensitive to global public opinion, which is another outcome of prioritizing political goals over military ones, while Israel is impervious to public opinion at home, in Lebanon, and across the world. <\/strong>Russia will therefore put its troops in harm\u2019s way capturing locations block-by-block as opposed to practicing \u201cshock and awe\u201d like Israel is doing in Lebanon. Even though Russia\u2019s approach led to a lot fewer civilian deaths, it\u2019s still criticized much as Israel is, if not more.<\/p>\n

Israel believes that fear inspires respect, while Russia doesn\u2019t want to be feared since it thinks that this impression would assist the West\u2019s efforts to isolate it in the Global South. Respect, Russia believes, comes from restraining itself in order to protect civilians even at the cost of its own troops. Russia has also criticized the US for the way in which it waged the Afghan, Iraqi, and Libyan Wars, et al., and thus doesn\u2019t want to appear hypocritical by prioritizing military goals even at the expense of civilians\u2019 lives.<\/p>\n

Israel lacks the natural resources that Russia has so its opponents should have had a much easier time isolating it by at least getting others to impose symbolic sanctions, yet nobody has sanctioned Israel even though it\u2019s responsible for many more civilian deaths than Russia. Even Russia itself won\u2019t sanction Israel despite criticizing it. To be fair, the Global South hasn\u2019t sanctioned Russia either, but it needs Russian resources so it likely wouldn\u2019t sanction it even if it becomes responsible for many more civilian deaths.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the Global South\u2019s partnership with Russia\u00a0accelerates multipolar processes<\/a>\u00a0to their collective benefit, while the EU\u2019s anti-Russian sanctions were\u00a0meant to decelerate them<\/a>. It should therefore have been predictable that the first wouldn\u2019t submit to American pressure while the second would. Neither\u2019s calculations have anything to do with Russia\u2019s responsibility for civilian deaths and everything to do with their own grand strategy. Russia\u2019s sensitivity to global public opinion might thus be misplaced.<\/p>\n

The fourth lesson is that Israel\u2019s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (\u201cdeep state\u201d) are more convinced of their conflict\u2019s existential nature than Russia\u2019s appear to be.<\/strong> That\u2019s not to say that say that the Ukrainian Conflict isn\u2019t existential to Russia, which was explained\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0here<\/a>, but just that Russia would have prioritized military goals over political ones by now if its \u201cdeep state\u201d fully shared this assessment. Israel\u2019s certainly does regardless of whether one agrees with their conclusion.<\/p>\n

Russia is still restraining itself by continuing to fight an\u00a0improvised \u201cwar of attrition\u201d<\/a>\u00a0with the West in Ukraine after it couldn\u2019t successfully coerce Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands that were made of him during the special operation\u2019s initial stage instead of escalating to \u201cshock and awe\u201d. It still\u00a0won\u2019t destroy any bridges<\/a>\u00a0across the Dnieper due to its prioritization of political goals over military ones and sensitivity to global public opinion and has\u00a0even let several red lines be crossed<\/a>\u00a0already.<\/p>\n

To be sure, the West won\u2019t cross Russia\u2019s ultimate red lines of directly attacking it or Belarus or relying on Ukraine to launch large-scale strikes against them by proxy since it doesn\u2019t want World War III, but some hawks are now talking about the latter scenario, hence\u00a0why Russia just updated its nuclear doctrine<\/a>. By contrast, Hamas\u2019 sneak attack on 7 October 2023 crossed one of Israel\u2019s red lines but didn\u2019t ipso facto represent an existential threat since it was beaten back, yet Israel\u2019s \u201cdeep state\u201d still saw it differently.<\/p>\n

Although some differences of vision exist between various members thereof, this group as a whole is still convinced of the existential nature of the conflict that followed, ergo the prioritization of military goals over political ones that\u2019s the opposite of Russia\u2019s approach. To this day, despite compelling arguments from Russian officials about the existential nature of their country\u2019s conflict, its \u201cdeep state\u201d as a whole still doesn\u2019t seem to be as convinced of this as their Israeli counterparts are of their own conflict.<\/p>\n

A change in perceptions would lead to a change in how this conflict is fought, but that hasn\u2019t yet happened despite\u00a0drone attacks against the Kremlin<\/a>,\u00a0strategic airbases<\/a>, and even\u00a0early warning systems<\/a>, among many other provocations including\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s invasion of Kursk Region<\/a>. Time and again, despite reminding everyone about how existential this conflict is, Russia continues exercising self-restraint. Political goals are still prioritized over military ones and Russia is still sensitive to global public opinion.<\/p>\n

That could change if it learns the last lesson from Israel about \u201cradical decisiveness<\/a>\u201d.<\/strong> Philosopher Alexander Dugin wrote that \u201cThose who act with decisiveness and boldness win. We, on the other hand, are cautious and constantly hesitate. By the way, Iran is also following this path, which leads nowhere. Gaza is gone. Hamas\u2019 leadership is gone. Now Hezbollah\u2019s leadership is gone. And President Raisi of Iran is gone. Even his pager is gone. Yet Zelensky is still here. And Kiev stands as if nothing has happened.<\/p>\n

He ended on the ominous note that \u201cWe must either join the game for real or… The second option is something I don\u2019t even want to consider. But in modern warfare, timing, speed, and \u2018dromocracy\u2019 decide everything. The Zionists act swiftly, proactively. Boldly. And they win. We should follow their example.\u201d Dugin was the first to foresee the latent existential threat to Russia posed by 2014\u2019s \u201cEuroMaidan\u201d and has thus been pressing since the start of the special operation for it to stop exercising self-restraint.<\/p>\n

\u201cGoodwill gestures\u201d and self-restraint aren\u2019t appreciated by Ukraine, which perceives them as proof of weakness that have only served to embolden it to cross more of Russia\u2019s red lines. For as much as these policies have reduced civilian deaths, they haven\u2019t yet advanced their envisaged political goals over two and a half years since the latest phase of this\u00a0already decade-old conflict<\/a>\u00a0began. It might therefore be time to finally change them in light of how different the conflict has since become.<\/p>\n

Putin\u2019s noble plan of a grand Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation after the special operation ends appears to be more distant than ever, yet he still believes that it\u2019s supposedly viable enough to justify staying the course by continuing to prioritize political goals over military ones. He\u2019s the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with more information available to him than anyone else so he has solid reasons for this, but maybe Israel\u2019s example in Lebanon will inspire him to see things differently and act accordingly.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Tyler Durden<\/a><\/span>
\nMon, 09\/30\/2024 – 02:00<\/span><\/p>\n

\u200bhttps:\/\/www.zerohedge.com\/geopolitical\/five-lessons-russia-can-learn-latest-israeli-lebanese-war<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Five Lessons That Russia Can Learn From The Latest Israeli-Lebanese War Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack.com, The\u00a0latest Israeli-Lebanese War\u00a0and the\u00a0Ukrainian\u00a0Conflict\u00a0are so different from one…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":1492982,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1492981","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","wpcat-1-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1492981","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1492981"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1492981\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1492982"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1492981"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1492981"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1492981"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}