{"id":1501142,"date":"2024-11-08T07:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-11-08T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/?p=1501142"},"modified":"2024-11-08T07:00:00","modified_gmt":"2024-11-08T12:00:00","slug":"heres-what-trumps-peace-plan-might-look-like-why-russia-might-agree-to-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/heres-what-trumps-peace-plan-might-look-like-why-russia-might-agree-to-it\/1501142\/","title":{"rendered":"Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It"},"content":{"rendered":"

Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

Putin might agree to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact in spite of prior rhetoric against this scenario in the event that Trump threatens to escalate the conflict as punishment if he doesn\u2019t…<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s pledge to resolve the Ukrainian Conflict\u00a0in 24 hours<\/a>\u00a0is unrealistic, but he\u2019ll inevitably propose a peace plan at some point in time, thus raising questions about what it would look like and whether Russia would agree to it.<\/strong> More than likely, he\u2019ll seek to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact (LOC), wherever it may be by that time, as he\u2019s not expected to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing from the regions whose administrative borders Russia claims in their entirety.<\/p>\n

Nor is Russia expected to obtain control over them by the time that Trump\u2019s proposal is made. It still hasn\u2019t removed Ukrainian forces from Donbass, which is at the heart of its claims, and therefore is unlikely to capture Zaporozhye city, that namesake\u2019s areas on the side of the Dnieper River, nor Kherson Region\u2019s aforesaid adjacent lands either. It might gain some more territory\u00a0if Pokrovsk is captured<\/a>, but the US might dangerously \u201cescalate to de-escalate\u201d to stop a run on the river if Ukraine is then routed.<\/p>\n

This could take the form of threatening a\u00a0conventional NATO intervention<\/a>\u00a0if the political will exists to spark a Cuban-like brinskmanship crisis, the odds of which would greatly increase if Russia made any move in that scenario to cross the Dnieper and thus risk the collapse of that bloc\u2019s Ukrainian project. Be that as it may, no such run on the river is expected, with the most that Russia might do is lay siege to Zaporozhye city, but even that might not materialize by the time that Trump shares his peace plan.<\/p>\n

Russia will therefore almost certainly be asked to freeze the conflict along the LOC, albeit without rescinding its territorial claims just like Ukraine won\u2019t either, under the threat of Trump ramping up military support to Ukraine if the Kremlin refuses to cease hostilities. <\/strong>This prediction is predicated on\u00a0summer\u2019s report<\/a>\u00a0that some of his advisors suggested that he do precisely that as punishment for Russia rubbishing whatever peace plan that he ultimately offers it.<\/p>\n

Considering his tough-talking personality and proclivity for \u201cescalating to de-escalate\u201d on his terms if he feels disrespected, which he flirted doing with North Korea during his first term as a negotiating tactic, he\u2019s thus expected to comply with the aforesaid suggestion in that event. Given\u00a0Putin\u2019s consummate pragmatism<\/a>\u00a0as he understands his style to be and his aversion to escalations, he might very well comply, but he could also request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making concessions to facilitate this.<\/p>\n

These might include rescinding\u00a02019\u2019s constitutional amendment<\/a>\u00a0making NATO membership a strategic objective, promulgating legislation that Russia considers to advance its denazification goals, freezing further weapons shipments to Ukraine, and carving out a buffer zone within part of Ukrainian territory.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the order that they were mentioned, the first one would be superficial after this year\u2019s raft of security guarantees<\/strong> between Ukraine and several NATO countries already made it a de facto member of the bloc.<\/p>\n

To explain, they all entail commitments to resume their existing military support for Ukraine if its conflict with Russia flares up again upon its eventual end, and this selfsame support arguably aligns with NATO\u2019s Article 5. Contrary to popular perceptions, it doesn\u2019t obligate them to send troops, but only to provide whatever support they believe is necessary to aid allies under attack. This is what they\u2019re already doing, yet Russia never escalated in response to this being enshrined in their bilateral military deals.<\/p>\n

As for the second speculative concession that Putin might request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making, the returning American leader and his team haven\u2019t ever signaled any interest in helping Russia denazify Ukraine, and coercing it into promulgating legislation might be seen as bad optics abroad.<\/strong> Since Russia can\u2019t force Ukraine to do this, that particular goal of the\u00a0special<\/a>\u00a0operation<\/a>\u00a0will likely remain unfulfilled, in which case it probably wouldn\u2019t be discussed much anymore by officials and the media.<\/p>\n

Moving along to the third, Trump probably wouldn\u2019t agree to freeze arms shipments to Ukraine, but they might naturally be curtailed as he refocuses America\u2019s military priorities on containing China<\/strong> in Asia instead of continuing to contain Russia in Europe. About that, his reported plan to encourage NATO members to take more responsibility for their defense is already being implemented under Biden as explained\u00a0here<\/a>, and they might continue arms shipments even if the US curtails its own.<\/p>\n

Even so, the potentially natural curtailment of US arms shipments to Ukraine could be spun as partially fulfilling Russia\u2019s demilitarization goal, as could any buffer zone that Trump might agree to coerce Ukraine into carving out on its own territory to prevent it from shelling Russian cities. That\u2019ll be a hard sell for Putin to make, and Trump might be pressured by the \u201cdeep state\u201d (the permanent members of the US\u2019 military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies) into resisting, but it can\u2019t be ruled out either.<\/p>\n

The reason for this cautious optimism is because it would provide a \u201cface-saving\u201d means for Russia to freeze the conflict despite not achieving its maximum objectives instead of risking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis<\/strong> by rejecting Trump\u2019s expected proposal to \u201csave face\u201d at home and abroad. Trump wouldn\u2019t make idle threats and certainly wouldn\u2019t let Putin call his bluff even if that was the case so he\u2019s expected to go through with arming Ukraine to the teeth if his peace deal falls flat.<\/p>\n

That said, he also campaigned on ending the Ukrainian Conflict, and he\u2019d personally prefer to replenish America\u2019s depleted stockpiles in parallel with arming its Asian allies to the teeth against China instead continuing to arm Ukraine and risking a major crisis with Russia. His Sino-centric\u00a0New Cold War<\/a>\u00a0focus is shared by a minority of the \u201cdeep state\u201d, the majority of whom want to\u00a0continue prioritizing Russia\u2019s containment in Europe over China\u2019s in Asia<\/a>\u00a0but who still never recklessly escalated with Russia thus far.<\/p>\n

They\u2019ve indeed escalated, but this was always preceded by\u00a0signaling their intent<\/a>\u00a0to do so (such as via the provisioning of various arms) long before this happened, thus giving Russia enough time to calculate a response instead of risking an \u201coverreaction\u201d that could spiral into war with NATO. These anti-Russian hawks might therefore begrudgingly go along with any buffer zone that Trump might agree to if it avoids a potentially uncontrollable escalation like what he might threaten to do if Russia doesn\u2019t take his deal.<\/p>\n

Subversive \u201cdeep state\u201d elements might even try to provoke such an escalation in order to avert that buffer zone scenario or any other that they consider to be unacceptable concessions to Russia, which remains a risk before and after his inauguration, but it\u2019s clearly not their faction\u2019s preferred scenario.<\/strong> This conclusion is arrived at by recalling on the abovementioned observation about how they always signaled their escalatory intentions far in advance thus far at least in order to avoid a major escalation.<\/p>\n

Even if Trump doesn\u2019t comply with any of Putin\u2019s speculative requests to help the latter \u201csave face\u201d by freezing the conflict despite not achieving his country\u2019s maximum goals in the conflict, he could always dangle the carrot of phased sanctions relief of the sort proposed by Richard Haass\u00a0earlier this week<\/a>. The former President of the hugely influential Council on Foreign Relations suggested that this could encourage Russia\u2019s compliance with a ceasefire, and it\u2019s possible that Putin might agree to this.<\/p>\n

The Russian economy\u00a0weathered<\/a>\u00a0the West\u2019s unprecedented sanctions regime, but Russia\u2019s grand plans to create alternative financial institutions and pivot to the non-West haven\u2019t been as successful.<\/strong> This analysis\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0about how the latest BRICS Summit achieved nothing of tangible significance at all points out how none of this association\u2019s ambitious initiatives were rolled out. It also hyperlinks to proof that the Chinese-based\u00a0New Development Bank<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0SCO Bank<\/a>\u00a0surprisingly comply with US sanctions.<\/p>\n

Moreover, \u201cRussia & China\u2019s US-Provoked Payment Problems Caught Most BRICS Enthusiasts By Surprise<\/a>\u201d in early September after\u00a0RT published a feature analysis<\/a>\u00a0about this politically inconvenient development, which shows that the Chinese centerpiece of Russia\u2019s grand plans isn\u2019t fully on board with them. There\u2019s also the similarly inconvenient fact that Russia\u2019s pivot to the non-West mostly only consists of resource sales to such countries and has yet to become anything more significant.<\/p>\n

It accordingly wouldn\u2019t be surprising if Putin appreciated promises of phased sanctions relief in exchange for agreeing to freeze the conflict along the LOC no matter how disappointing of an end this may be to its special operation in the eyes of its most zealous supporters. After all, Foreign Minister Lavrov\u00a0told<\/a>\u00a0a group of ambassadors last month that Russia demands \u201cthe lifting of Western anti-Russian sanctions\u201d, so it\u2019s clearly on the collective Kremlin\u2019s mind no matter what its perception managers claim.<\/p>\n

Even if Trump makes such promises, however, keeping them would be difficult since many of America\u2019s anti-Russian sanctions are codified into law after being voted on by Congress. They might go along with any request to rescind them, but they also might not, thus throwing a wrench in Russia\u2019s plans. The US also can\u2019t force the EU to rescind its respective sanctions, and anti-Russian countries like Poland and the Baltic States might create obstacles to the resumption of trade with Russia if the EU\u2019s ties with it thaw. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Should they be implemented even if only semi-successfully, then Trump could claim a victory in \u201cun-uniting<\/a>\u201d Russia and China like he promised to do even if those two\u2019s trade continues to grow (mostly through Chinese resource imports and replacing lost Western products on Russian shelves).<\/strong> He could also sell this phased sanctions relief proposal to anti-Russian \u201cdeep state\u201d hawks and the Europeans on that basis to help secure their support and deflect from claims that he\u2019s doing it as a favor to Putin.<\/p>\n

Reflecting on the insight that was shared in this analysis, Trump\u2019s peace plan isn\u2019t expected to have any surprises, nor would it be surprising if Russia agrees to it for the reasons that were explained. The US holds the cards and will only agree to any of Putin\u2019s speculatively requested concessions in order to make it easier for him to \u201csave face\u201d for freezing the conflict despite not achieving his maximum goals. Neither wants a major escalation and both are fatigued with this proxy war so such a deal might work.<\/p>\n

It’ll therefore be interesting to see how the rhetoric from Russian officials and their global media ecosystem might change as\u00a0reports leak out<\/a>\u00a0about what exactly Trump has in mind. He and the minority \u201cdeep state\u201d faction that supports him are motivated by their desire to \u201cPivot (back) to Asia<\/a>\u201d in order to more muscularly contain China, hence their interest in wrapping up this proxy war. As for Russia, it\u2019s beginning to realize that a compromise of some sort is inevitable and must thus prepare the public.<\/p>\n

Something unexpected might of course happen to completely change this analysis such as if hawks on either side convince their respective presidents to double down on the conflict, but the arguments made therein cogently account for each side\u2019s interests, especially Russia\u2019s. <\/strong>If everything more or less unfolds as written, then observers can expect a \u201cGreat Media\/Perception Reset\u201d in terms of Russia\u2019s narrative towards the conflict, which would be required to facilitate whatever compromises Putin might make.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Tyler Durden<\/a><\/span>
\nFri, 11\/08\/2024 – 02:00<\/span><\/p>\n

\u200bhttps:\/\/www.zerohedge.com\/geopolitical\/heres-what-trumps-peace-plan-might-look-why-russia-might-agree-it<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack, Putin might agree to…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":1501143,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1501142","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","wpcat-1-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1501142","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1501142"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1501142\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1501143"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1501142"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1501142"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1501142"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}