{"id":1511318,"date":"2025-01-02T14:40:00","date_gmt":"2025-01-02T19:40:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/?p=1511318"},"modified":"2025-01-02T14:40:00","modified_gmt":"2025-01-02T19:40:00","slug":"the-political-consequences-of-ukraines-decision-to-cut-off-russian-gas-to-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/the-political-consequences-of-ukraines-decision-to-cut-off-russian-gas-to-europe\/1511318\/","title":{"rendered":"The Political Consequences Of Ukraine’s Decision To Cut Off Russian Gas To Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Political Consequences Of Ukraine’s Decision To Cut Off Russian Gas To Europe<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack,<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

Russia and the EU will manage the latest phase of their US-instigated divorce without much difficulty, but the US might offer to bring them back together by authorizing its vassals\u2019 import of Russian pipeline gas in exchange for some concessions from the Kremlin in the energy sector and Ukraine…<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Pundits are discussing Ukraine\u2019s decision to cut off Russian gas to Europe after Kiev\u00a0refused to extend<\/a>\u00a0its five-year agreement with Moscow that expired on the first of the year, with the vast majority laying blame on the other side and hyping up the negative consequences for their opponent\u2019s interests.<\/strong> The reality is that this development is much more political than anything else since the EU and Russia already weathered much more serious disruptions throughout 2022.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Yamal pipeline<\/a>\u00a0through Poland was shut down a few months after the\u00a0special<\/a>\u00a0operation<\/a>\u00a0began for sanctions-related reasons while Nord Stream 1 was gradually phased out of operation due to maintenance needs worsened by Canada\u2019s\u00a0delay on returning<\/a>\u00a0repaired gas turbines to Russia. That pipeline and the inactive Nord Stream 2 were then blown up in a\u00a0terrorist attack<\/a>\u00a0in September of that year, though one still remains undamaged but has yet to re-enter into operation for political reasons.<\/p>\n

The combined effect resulted in the share of Russia\u2019s pipeline gas in EU imports plunging \u201cfrom over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0according to the European Council<\/a>. Nevertheless, the EU \u201cnarrowly avoided\u201d a recession that year\u00a0in CNN\u2019s words<\/a>, though it could enter into one later this year\u00a0if Germany\u2019s economic struggles deepen<\/a>. Even so, it won\u2019t be directly affected by Ukraine\u2019s latest decision since this route\u00a0only concerns 5% of EU imports<\/a>, with the main clients being Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova.<\/p>\n

The first two are led by conservative-nationalists who are fiercely opposed to NATO\u2019s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine while the third is ruled by a pro-Western figure who wants to reconquer her country\u2019s separatist region of Transnistria in which several thousand Russian peacekeepers are still based. This observation lends credence to the earlier claim that Ukraine\u2019s decision is much more political than anything else since it punishes Slovakia, Hungary, and Transnistria without harming other countries.<\/p>\n

The last-mentioned is being hit particularly hard since it had to\u00a0halt heating and hot water to households<\/a>, which could lead to political unrest that might be manipulated from abroad to provoke a\u00a0Color Revolution<\/a>. <\/strong>This could either result in regime change or weaken that polity enough from within that it becomes much easier for Moldova (with\u00a0possible Romanian assistance<\/a>) and\/or Ukraine to invade. Russia\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Service warned about that scenario last month, which was analyzed\u00a0here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Slovakia and Hungary won\u2019t be harmed anywhere as much as Transnistria since each can import costlier LNG \u2013 whether from Russia, the US (which has poached a lot of its rival\u2019s former EU market share), Algeria, and\/or Qatar \u2013 from Lithuania\/Poland or Croatia. Poland can connect Slovakia to\u00a0Lithuania\u2019s Klaipeda LNG terminal<\/a>\u00a0while Croatia\u2019s Krk LNG terminal can supply\u00a0Slovakia<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Hungary<\/a>. Hungary is also\u00a0already getting some pipeline gas<\/a>\u00a0from TurkStream, which is Russia\u2019s last pipeline to Europe.<\/p>\n

All three are therefore being punished for political reasons, but it\u2019s only Transnistria that risks an all-out crisis as a result,<\/strong> which could lead to an outcome that deals political damage to Russia if the government there is overthrown through an upcoming Color Revolution or that polity is captured by its neighbors. In the event that another conventional conflict erupts, the aggressors might eschew targeting Russian troops in order to avoid provoking an escalation, but Russia can always still authorize them to intervene.<\/p>\n

Observers can only speculate what Russia would do since there are arguments in favor of it withdrawing its peacekeepers if they aren\u2019t attacked and Transnistria falls but there\u2019s also a logic in sacrificing them as part of a plan to \u201cescalate to de-escalate\u201d the special operation on better terms. There\u2019s also the possibility that Transnistria doesn\u2019t slip into a Color Revolution and isn\u2019t invaded either. A potentially larger crisis would be averted so this is the best scenario for everyone\u2019s objective interests.<\/p>\n

Regardless of whatever may or may not happen in Transnistria, Ukraine\u2019s decision to cut off Russian gas to Europe leads to the possibility that this route could be reopened once the conflict ends, thus representing a card that could be played to entice concessions from the Kremlin during negotiations. The same holds true for the Yamal pipeline and the last undamaged part of Nord Stream. Europe could use low-cost Russian gas to more confidently avoid a recession while Russia would appreciate the revenue.<\/p>\n

To be sure, Russia\u00a0still<\/a>\u00a0profits<\/a>\u00a0from LNG exports to the EU, which have filled the supply gap caused by the EU sanctioning its pipeline gas and Russia\u2019s LNG competitors being unable to scale their exports to the point of fully replacing Russia\u2019s exports that the EU still imports out of necessity. That said, Russia and the EU would mutually benefit a lot more if they returned as much as possible to their pre-2022 arrangement, though of course keeping in mind the contemporary political limitations to that.<\/p>\n

America would have to approve this since it\u00a0successfully reasserted its previously declining hegemony<\/a>\u00a0over the EU since the start of the special operation<\/strong>, however, but creative energy diplomacy of the sort elaborated on last month\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0could help lead to a breakthrough. The gist is that it\u2019s the US that has an interest in making concessions to this end, not Russia, since the US doesn\u2019t want Russia further fueling China\u2019s superpower rise like it could do out of spite if it isn\u2019t offered a good deal in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

At the same time, it\u2019s unrealistic to imagine that the US will cede its influence over the EU, ergo why it might propose a compromise whereby Russia isn\u2019t allowed to (re)obtain control over the European portions of Nord Stream, Yamal, and the trans-Ukrainian Brotherhood and Soyuz pipelines. The first could be purchased by an American investor as was analyzed\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0in November while Poland might\u00a0retain its post-2022 control<\/a>\u00a0over the second and the third would remain under Ukrainian control.<\/p>\n

If the US really wants to incentivize Russia into agreeing to this proposal, which advances US interests by increasing the chances that Russia won\u2019t build more pipelines to China out of the need to replace its lost revenue from the EU, then it can partially compensate Russia by releasing some of its seized assets. Even though those assets are legally Russia\u2019s and were stolen from it, the Kremlin might agree to this swap if a large enough amount is offered in order to help manage its latest fiscal and monetary challenges.<\/p>\n

In exchange for the US returning some of Russia\u2019s seized assets and authorizing the EU\u2019s resumption of some Russia gas pipeline imports, Russia might have to informally commit to not building any new pipelines to China while scaling back some of its demilitarization and denazification demands of Ukraine.<\/strong> American, Indian, and Japanese investment in Russia\u2019s sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 megaproject could also replace\u00a0frozen Chinese investment<\/a>\u00a0if waivers are granted for that purpose as a further incentive.<\/p>\n

So long as Russia\u2019s core security goals are achieved, which are restoring Ukraine\u2019s constitutional neutrality and keeping\u00a0uniformed Western forces<\/a>\u00a0out of the country, then it might be willing to compromise on demilitarizing all of Ukraine by settling for demilitarizing everything east of the Dnieper. This scenario was described more in detail at the end of this analysis\u00a0here<\/a>, which could include the vaguely defined denazification of that historically Russian region too instead of the entire country.<\/p>\n

If Trump offers to\u00a0terminate the US\u2019 bilateral security agreement with Ukraine<\/a>\u00a0as part of a package deal that includes the abovementioned terms, then Russia might very well accept it since this would provide a mutually \u201cface-saving\u201d means for ending their proxy war while creating a basis for rebuilding relations.<\/strong> It\u2019s not a perfect compromise, and some of each side\u2019s supporters might argue that it\u2019s more beneficial for their opponent, but their leaders might think differently and that\u2019s all that ultimately matters.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Tyler Durden<\/a><\/span>
\nThu, 01\/02\/2025 – 09:40<\/span><\/p>\n

\u200bhttps:\/\/www.zerohedge.com\/geopolitical\/political-consequences-ukraines-decision-cut-russian-gas-europe<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Political Consequences Of Ukraine’s Decision To Cut Off Russian Gas To Europe Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack, Russia and the EU will manage…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":1511319,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1511318","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","wpcat-1-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1511318","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1511318"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1511318\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1511319"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1511318"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1511318"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bugaluu.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1511318"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}